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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - TORT LIABILITY - PURCHASE OF 
LIABILITY INSURANCE AS w AIVER OF IMMUNITY-According to a 
well-established common law rule, a municipal corporation is 
immune to tort liability for wrongs committed in the performance 
of governmental or public functions, although it is liable for torts 
committed in the performance of corporate or proprietary func-
tions.1 This immunity generally cannot be waived without the 
authorization of the state legislature, and this authorization must 
1 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §53.01 et seq. (1950). It should be 
noted that one method of distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions 
is to say that a proprietary function is one which could be carried on as well by private 
citizens or corporations as by a political subdivision of the state, whereas a governmental 
function is one which is or could be carried on alone by political subdivisions of the 
state by reason of their governmental nature. The presence or absence of profit is another, 
though less reliable, difference. 
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be very clearly stated.2 Interesting questions arise, therefore, 
when a municipality, with or without statutory authorization, 
takes out a liability insurance policy covering itself or its agents, 
or when it causes its agents to take out bonds for faithful perform-
ance. The questions concern both the power of the municipal 
corporation to carry such insurance, and the effect of carrying it 
both on the corporation and on the insurer. 
Any discussion of these questions with reference to municipal 
corporations must necessarily involve a discussion of state political 
subdivisions other than municipal corporations, for a majority of 
the decisions on these questions have involved the latter. It should 
be noted that state political subdivisions other than municipal 
corporations also enjoy immunity from tort liability for wrongs 
committed in the performance of governmental or public func-
tions, 3 and that such immunity, as with that of municipalities, 
generally cannot be waived without express authorization from the 
legislature.4 
I. Power of Municipal Corporations to Insure Against 
Tort Liability 
A number of states, feeling a moral obligation to persons 
injured by torts committed by agents of their political subdivi-
sions, have enacted statutes enabling such persons to obtain com-
pensation for their injuries. Several states have accomplished this 
by making their governmental subdivisions liable for certain 
designated torts.5 Other states, without creating a primary liability 
on the part of governmental subdivisions, have accomplished a 
somewhat similar result through statutes authorizing6 or requir-
.ll Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, (Ind. App. 1953) 112 N.E. (2d) 891; Ritt-
miller v. School District No. 84, (D.C. Minn. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 187; Marmor v. Port of 
New York Authority, 203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 177 (1952); Contra, Bailey v. Knoxville, 
(D.C. Tenn. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 3, noted in 52 MICH. L. REv. 457 (1954). 
3 5 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT 361 (1940). 
4 See note 2 supra. 
5 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §53.03 (1950). 
6 California: Cal. Civ. Code Ann. (Deering, 1951) §53056 (allows insurance for in-
juries around public property); Indiana: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1952) §38-1819 (state 
motor vehicles can be covered); Iowa: Iowa Code (1954) §517A.I (state motor vehicles); 
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §160.310 (school bus drivers); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. 
Stat. (1952) § 160-191.1 (city can waive immunity as to motor vehicles up to the amount of 
the insurance); North Dakota: N.D. Rev. Code (Supp. 1949) §39-0108 (state or municipal 
motor vehicles); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3327.09 (school buses); Oregon: 
Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953) §332.180 (schools); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954 
Supp.) tit. 24, §7-774 (school employees); South Dakota: S.D. Laws (1955) c. 199 (city and 
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ing7 the subdivisions to procure liability or indemnity insurance, 
or requiring the officers or agents of such governmental units to 
take out bonds for faithful performance.8 Some of these statutes 
provide for suit directly against the insurer,9 while at least one 
provides that suit first be brought against the insured to determine 
the issue of liability.10 The statutes are usually silent as to the 
carrying of insurance to cover losses for which there is no legal 
liability under the governmental-proprietary distinction. How-
ever, the majority of such permissive statutes are designed to cover 
the school bus problem, and this is normally held to be a govern-
mental, non-liability area.11 Some subdivisions, it should be noted, 
carry msurance without any statutory authorization.12 
II. Effect Upon Municipal Corporation 
The traditional immunity of municipal corporations to lia-
bility for torts is double-edged, consisting of both an immunity to 
suit and an immunity to legal liability for the tort. The distinction 
is an important one, for when the insurance policy provides that 
judgment must be obtained against the insured before the insurer 
is liable upon the policy, a waiver of the municipal corporation's 
immunity to liability is of no benefit to the injured person if its 
immunity to suit is not also waived. Also, the mere fact that the 
municipality's immunity to suit is waived does not necessarily ren-
county hospitals); Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1949) art. 6166zl0; West Virginia: W.Va. 
Code (1949) §1774(7) (school bus drivers). 
7 Connecticut: Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. (1949; Supp. 1953) §§680, 774C (fire truck drivers, 
school employees); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. (1952) tit. 32, §§32.429 and 32.431 (school 
buses); Idaho: Idaho Code (1947) §33-801 (school buses); Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. 
(Purdon, Supp. 1954) tit. 71, §634 (state motor vehicles); Vermont: Vt. Laws (1949) No. 
243, §5 (school bus driver must take and pay for the insurance); Virginia: Va. Code 
(1950) §§22.284 to 22.294 (school bus drivers); Wisconsin: Wis. Laws (1953) c. 90, §109 
(school buses); Wyoming: Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1953) §67-647 (school board 
or driver must pay). 
8 Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §2326.5 (school bus drivers). In Rogers v. Butler, 
170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W. (2d) 414 (1935), this statute was interpreted to give the school 
board authority to purchase liability insurance as an alternative way of fulfilling the duty 
of safe transportation of school children. 
9 Ga. Code Ann. (1952) tit. 32, §§32-429, 32-431; Okla. Stat. (Supp. 1954) tit. 69, 
§§30.11 and 30.15. See Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., (La. App. 1936) 
169 S. 132, in which La. Gen. Codes (Dart, 1932) §4248 [since repealed and replaced by 
La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 22, §655] is so interpreted. 
10 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §160.310. 
115 LEGAL NOTES ON LoCAL GOVERNMENT 358 (1940). 
12 See Jones v. Scofield Bros., Inc., (D.C. Md. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 395; Marmor v. Port 
of New York Authority, 203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 177 (1952); Thomas v. Broadlands 
Community Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E. (2d) 636 (1952); Tracy v. 
Davis, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 160. 
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der the municipality itself liable, as the purpose underlying the 
waiver of immunity to suit may be just to determine the insurer's 
liability. 
A. Waiver of Immunity to Tort Liability. The problem of 
whether a municipal corporation waives its immunity to tort lia-
bility by carrying insurance has three possible solutions: (I) the 
municipality does not waive its immunity to tort liability at all; (2) 
immunity is waived to the extent of the insurance coverage; or 
(3) immunity is completely waived. 
The majority of courts which have had occasion to consider 
the problem have held that the subdivision does not waive its 
immunity by carrying the insurance.13 This result has obtained 
even where the policy contained a provision whereby insurer 
agreed not to avail itself of the immunity of the insured.14 The 
theory behind these decisions is that a governmental subdivision's 
tort immunity is a sovereign attribute which may be waived only 
by the state legislature and not through the action of either the 
subdivision itself or any of its officers or agents. In those states 
with statutes merely authorizing the carrying of insurance, it has 
been held that the subdivision is authorized to insure only against 
those risks for which it might legally be liable, and that the carry-
ing of insurance cannot, therefore, create liability where none 
existed before.15 This result is especially clear where the policy 
is one of indemnity only. Some statutes which provide that a sub-
division must carry insurance also provide that payment of the 
premiums will in no way impose liability on the subdivision.16 
One jurisdiction which authorizes the procurement of liability 
insurance has provided that the procurement of such insurance 
shall create no new liability on the part of the insured, but that 
the insured may be sued to determine the liability of the insurer.17 
13 Burns v. American Casualty Co., 127 Cal. App. 198, 269 P. (2d) 656, affd. on re-
hearing (Cal. App. 1954) 273 P. (2d) 605; Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A. 
(2d) 923 (1943); Benton v. Board of Education, 201 N.C. 653, 161 S.E. 96 (1931); Cush-
man v. County of Grafton, 97 N.H. 32, 79 A. (2d) 630 (1951); Texas Prison Board v. 
Cabeen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 159 S.W. (2d) 523. Contra: Thomas v. Broadlands Com-
munity Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E. (2d) 636 (1952); Tracy v. 
Davis, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 160. 
14Taylor v. Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W. (2d) 700 (1942); Stephenson 
v. Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E. (2d) 195 (1950); Marmor v. Port of New York Authority, 
203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 177 (1952); Pohland v. Sheyboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W. 
(2d) 736 (1947). 
15 Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, (Ind. App. 1953) 112 N.E. (2d) 891; 
Texas Prison Board v. Cabeen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 159 S.W. (2d) 523. 
16 Ga. Code Ann. (1952) §§32-429, 32-431; Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §§471.42, 471.43. 
17 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §160.310. See Taylor v. Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 
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In yet other jurisdictions, a direct action against the insurer 
may be maintained, either by virtue of statutory authorization18 
or provisions of the policy.19 Where the statute itself provides 
for a direct action against the insurer, allowing no action directly 
against the subdivision, the result would seem to be to waive the 
subdivision's immunity from liability to the extent of the insur-
ance coverage, while retaining the· subdivision's immunity from 
suit. In this situation, the question may arise as to whether the 
insurer may avail itself of the subdivision's defense of immunity. 
This problem will be discussed later. 
When the issue arises in the context of an employee's bond for 
faithful performance, the situation is similar. It has been held 
that a party injured by the tort of the employee cannot sue on the 
bond, nor can he sue the subdivision directly, as the bond is pay-
able to the subdivision, and the injured party is neither party, 
privy, nor beneficiary to the contract.20 
· When the subdivision procures insurance without statutory 
authorization, the attitude of some courts has been that, since the 
subdivision could not waive its immunity from tort liability by 
its mvn act, the procurement by it of insurance against liability 
for torts for which it was not otherwise liable is an ultra vires act.21 
Other courts have merely stated that, in the absence of legislative 
imposition of tort liability, a governmental subdivision cannot 
impose such liability upon itself.22 
Flying in the face of the majority view, two states have held 
that when a governmental subdivision carries insurance against 
claims for which it would not otherwise be liable, the subdivision 
waives its immunity to tort liability, as well as its immunity to 
suit, to the extent of the insurance coverage. 23 The theory of 
167 S.W. (2d) 700 (1942); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, (D.C. Ky. 
1947) 72 F. Supp. 142. 
18 Ga. Code Ann. (1952) tit. 32, §§32-429, 32-431; Okla. StaL (Supp. 1954) tit. 69, 
§§30.11 and 30.15. See Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., (La. App. 1936) 
169 S. 132, in which La. Gen. Codes (Dart, 1932) §4248 is so interpreted. See note 9 supra. 
19 McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W. (2d) 679 (1938). 
20 Benton v. Board of Education, 201 N.C. 653, 161 S.E. 96 (1931). 
21 Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A. (2d) 923 (1943); Boice v. Board 
of Education, 111 W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931); Board of Education v. Commercial 
Casualty Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 503, 182 S.E. 87 (1935). Contra: Thomas v. Broadlands 
Community Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E. (2d) 636 (1952); Tracy v. 
Davis, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 160. 
22 See note 2 supra. 
23 Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W. (2d) 414 (1935); City of Kingsport v. 
Lane, 25 Tenn. App. 183, 243 S.W. (2d) 289 (1951); Bailey v. Knoxville, (D.C. Tenn. 
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the Tennessee and Illinois courts is that the basis for the rule 
of non-liability is that the subdivision ordinarily has no fund from 
which to pay a judgment, but that when, by carrying insurance, 
it creates such a fund, it becomes liable for the tort. 
No case has been found which holds that the carrying of in-
surance is a complete waiver of tort immunity and creates full 
liability for the judgment obtained by the injured party.24 
B. Waiver of I mm unity From Suit. The problem of whether 
a governmental subdivision waives its immunity from suit by carry-
ing liability insurance also has three possible solutions: (I) the 
subdivision completely waives its immunity to suit; (2) it waives 
its immunity to suit solely for the purpose of determining the 
liability of the insurer; or (3) it does not waive its immunity to 
suit at all. 
As has been seen, some jurisdictions hold that a governmental 
subdivision, by taking out insurance, completely waives its im-
munity to suit as well as its immunity to tort liability to the ex-
tent of the insurance coverage. 25 The net effect of these decisions 
is that the subdivision is equally liable with the insurer, but that 
no funds beyond the amount of the insurance may be used to 
satisfy the judgment. 
Some decisions have held that, by carrying liability insurance, 
a governmental subdivision waives its immunity to suit for the 
purpose of determining the liability of the insurer.26 This result 
obtains not only in Kentucky, where there is statutory authoriza-
tion both for the procurement of insurance and for the suit against 
1953) 113 F. Supp. 3, noted in 52 MICH. L. REv. 457 (1954). [This case, a suit against an 
airport run by a municipal corporation which had acquired insurance, was so decided 
despite Tenn. Code. Ann. (Williams, 1934) §2726.22, which forbids such suits against 
airports]; Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 
109 N.E. (2d) 636 (1952); Tracy v. Davis, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 160. In Illinois 
there is no statute authorizing insurance coverage. 
24 New York, through interpretation of a statute abolishing state immunity, has 
held that since municipal immunity is a derivative immunity, it, too, is gone. This is 
applied to all municipal employees on municipal business. See Lloyd, "Municipal Tort 
Liability in New York," 23 N.Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 278 (1948). 
25 Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W. (2d) 414 (1935); City of Kingsport v. 
Lane, 35 Tenn. App. 183,243 S.W. (2d) 289 (1951); Bailey v. Knoxville, (D.C. Tenn. 1953) 
113 F. Supp. 3, noted in 52 MICH. L. REv. 457 (1954); Thomas v. Broadlands Community 
Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E. (2d) 636 (1952); Tracy v. Davis, (D.C. 
Ill. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 160. 
26 Taylor v. Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W. (2d) 700 (1942); Standard 
Accident Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, (D.C. Ky. 1947) 72 F. Supp. I~. See also 
Brooks v. Clark Co., 297 Ky. 549, 180 S.W. (2d) 300 (1944). 
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the subdivision,27 but would also seem to follow from the Ten-
nessee and Illinois decisions. 28 
Other jurisdictions which have passed upon this question have 
treated the dual immunity of the subdivision as one, and have 
refused to allow the maintenance of the suit against the subdivi-
sion, even for the purpose of determining the liability of the in-
surer.29 
III. Effect Upon Insurer of Carriage of Insurance Against 
Tort Liability by Municipal Corporation 
A multitude of problems beset the insurer which insures a 
municipal corporation against liability for torts committed by its 
agents. The first problem which arises is whether the insurer may 
be sued directly upon the policy. If not, and if the insured has 
not waived its immunity to suit by carrying the insurance, the 
insured may attempt to recover the premiums paid on the policy. If 
the insurer may be sued directly on the policy by the injured 
party, the question then becomes whether the insurer may avail 
itself of the insured's defense of immunity to tort liability, pro-
viding again that such immunity is not waived by the carrying 
of the insurance. In those jurisdictions where the carriage of in-
surance against liability for torts committed in the performance 
of governmental functions is considered to be an ultra vires act 
on the part of the insured, 30 there is an issue as to whether the 
insurer may avail itself of this defense as well. And where the 
insurer may avail itself of one or both of these defenses, the prob-
lem arises, again, whether the insured may recover the premiums 
paid on the policy. 
The question of whether the insurer may be sued directly upon 
the insurance policy by the person injured turns upon the language 
of the insurance contract itself. The terms of a liability insurance 
contract ordinarily provide that the insurer's obligation arises out 
of the legal liability of the insured, and that "no action shall lie 
against the company-until the amount of the insured's obliga-
27 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §160.310. 
28 See note 25 supra. 
29 Stephenson v. Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E. (2d) 195 (1950); Utz v. Board of Edu-
cation, 126 W. Va. 823, 30 S.E. (2d) 342 (1944); Pohland v. Sheyboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 
N.W. (2d) 736 (1947); Wallace v. Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W. (2d) 915 
(1941). The Kentucky statute authorizing insurance was passed after the last case and 
the result would now be different. See Taylor v. Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 
S.W. (2d) 700 (1942). 
30 See note 21 supra. 
1956] COMMENTS 4ll 
tion to pay shall have been finally determined-by judgment 
against the insured after actual trial."31 In some cases, the injured 
party has been allowed to sue the insurer directly without first 
suing the insured. This result can be reached either by statutory 
authorization32 or when the policy itself so provides.33 
It is apparent that where the insurance policy contains a "no 
action" clause, and where there is no statutory authority for main-
tenance by the injured person of a direct action against the in-
surer, the insurer may not be sued directly on the insurance policy 
by the injured party. In Tennessee and Illinois, where the gov-
ernmental subdivision waives both its immunity to suit and its 
immunity to tort liability by carrying insurance,34 no problem need 
arise insofar as the rights of the injured party are concerned. In 
such a case, he may maintain an action directly against the sub-
division. If, for some technical or procedural reason, the insurer 
is not liable on the policy, the municipality would probably not 
be required to pay the judgment out of public funds.35 
In the majority of jurisdictions, where the governmental sub-
division has not waived its immunity to suit or its immunity to 
tort liability by carrying liability insurance, and no action may be 
maintained by the injured person directly against the insurer, the 
injured party generally has no right of recovery at all.36 A ques-
tion then arises whether the insured may recover the premiums 
it paid on the policy. In those jurisdictions in which the question 
has been litigated, the answer has been in the affirmative.37 The 
reason behind the recovery is illegality of consideration, as the in-
sured had no power to insure against risks for which it was not 
31 33 MINN. L REv. 634 at 635 (1949). 
32 See notes 9 and 18 supra. 
33 McCaleb v. Continental Casualty Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W. (2d) 679 (1938). 
34 City of Kingsport v. Lane, 35 Tenn. App. 183, 243 S.W. (2d) 289 (1951); Bailey 
v. Knoxville, (D.C. Tenn. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 3, noted in 52 MICH. L. REv. 457 (1954); 
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E. 
(2d) 636 (1952); Tracy v. Davis, (D.C. Ill. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 160. 
311 But see Bailey v. Knoxville, (D.C. Tenn. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 3, noted in 52 MICH. 
L. REv. 457 (1954). 
36 Cushman v. County of Grafton, 97 N.H. 32, 79 A. (2d) 630 (1951); Marmor v. 
Port of New York Authority, 203 Misc. 568, 116 N.Y.S. (2d) 177 (1952); Texas Prison 
Board v. Cabeen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 159 S.W. (2d) 523;- Boice v. Board of Education, 
Ill W. Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931). However, the action was allowed against the officers 
personally in Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, (Ind. App. 1953) 112 N.E. (2d) 
891, and the policy had already lapsed so that the question was left open in Utz v. Board 
of Education, 126 W. Va. 823, 36 S.E. (2d) 342 (1944), and there was an unjoined de-
fendant in Jones v. Scofield Bros. Inc., (D.C. Md. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 395. 
37 Burns v. American Casualty Co., 127 Cal. App. 198, 269 P. (2d) 656, affd. on re-
hearing (Cal. App. 1954) 273 P. (2d) 605; Board of Education v. Commercial Casualty 
Ins. Co., 116 W. Va. 503, 182 S.E. 87 (1935). 
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legally liable.38 Another possible reason for allowing recovery 
would be failure of consideration. It could be argued that the sole 
purpose in carrying the insurance was to benefit persons injured 
by torts of the subdivision, and, since those persons are not able 
to benefit from the insurance, the consideration has failed. 
In jurisdictions where, with or without the benefit of statutory 
mandate, the injured person may maintain an action directly 
against the insurer, the latter may attempt to assert defenses based 
on insured's immunity. In general, the insurer may raise the de-
fense that the insured has incurred no legal liability for the tort 
committed, and that, therefore, no ·wrong had been done to the 
injured party for which compensation could be obtained by him.89 
However, due to the fact that the reason behind the carrying of 
liability insurance by an immune entity is a desire to repay what 
it considers to be its moral obligations, it is quit~ common to find 
a provision in these policies to the effect that the insurer will not 
avail itself of the insured's defense of immunity.40 A few courts, 
even in the absence of such a clause, have held that the defense 
is personal to and solely for the benefit of the insured, and that 
only the insured may take advantage of it.41 
In those jurisdictions where the carrying of liability insurance 
by an immune ~ntity is an ultra vires act, the insurer, in a direct 
action against it by the injured person, may raise this defense to 
defeat recovery.42 
IV. Conclusion 
In general, the carrying of liability insurance is not a waiver 
of immunity from suit or from tort liability. This result is his-
torically supportable. However, it often results in a finding that 
an insurer is not liable on a policy because the insured can~ 
not be sued. This defeats the purpose of the policy, and to 
allow the immune entity to recover the premiums is no answer 
3Blbid. 
89 Hummer v. School City of Hartford City, (Ind. App. 1953) 112 N.E. (2d) 891; 
Texas Prison Board v. Cabeen, (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) 159 S.W. (2d) 523; Pohland v. 
Sheyboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W. (2d) 736 (1947); Brooks v. Clark Co., 297 Ky. 549, 
180 S.W. (2d) 300 (1944). See 33 MINN. L REv. 634 at 640 (1949). 
40 Stephenson v. Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E. (2d) 195 (1950); City of Kingsport v. 
Lane, 35 Tenn. App. 183, 243 S.W. (2d) 289 (1951); Pohland v. Sheyboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 
27 N.W. (2d) 736 (1947). See 33 MINN. L. REv. 634 at 640 (1949). 
41 Rome v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., (La. App. 1936) 169 S. 132; 
Burns v. American Casualty Co., 127 Cal. App. 198, 269 P. (2d) 656, affd. on rehearing 
(Cal. App. 1954) 273 P. (2d) 605. See 33 MINN. L. REv. 634 at 641 (1949). 
42 See 33 MINN. L. REv. 634 at 639 (1949). Contra, McCaleb v. Continental Casualty 
Co., 132 Tex. 65, 116 S.W. (2d) 679 (1938). 
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to the increasing problems of municipal torts. But a trend toward 
increasing municipal liability is discernible43 and ought to be given 
added judicial impetus. By scrapping the protection-of-public 
funds basis of the immunity where insurance makes this basis no 
longer sound, or by removing immunity to suit in statutes giving 
permission to insure, the public desire for the fair compensation 
of all injured parties could be given a realistic, economical, and 
just fulfillment. 
Alice Austin, S.Ed. * 
William C. Becker* 
48 Note, e.g., the present state of the law in New York (see note 24 supra), Illinois and 
Tennessee (see note 25 supra). 
• This comment was originally written by Alice Austin, and then revised and brought 
up to date by William C. Becker. 
